How does Scott Douglas Jacobsen assess the military, political, and human rights realities shaping Ukraine’s war with Russia?

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen responds to Rick Rosner on the evolving Ukraine war, arguing that logistical failures, communication breakdowns, and battlefield constraints have blunted Russia’s spring offensive. Jacobsen frames the conflict through universal human rights rather than partisan loyalty, emphasizing asymmetries in abuses, the long arc of the war since 2014, and the reform pressures on Ukraine from occupation and European integration. Rosner presses him on Crimea, corruption, living standards in Russia, and wartime change. The discussion then widens to include childbirth, cosmology, scientific skepticism, misinformation, and how people persist in believing in profitable nonsense.

Rick Rosner: Has the outlook for the war changed? You have been there for two months. Has Ukraine’s position changed at all?

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Russia’s expected spring offensive appears, so far, to have fallen short of what Moscow likely intended. A campaign like that depends on logistics and secure supply lines, and Ukraine has worked to disrupt both. The result seems to be that Russia’s capacity for a broad, sustained offensive has been weakened or blunted. That appears to be one of the main developments. Recent battlefield analysis also suggests that Russia is preparing for heavier fighting, but logistics remain a central constraint.

Another factor is communications. In February 2026, Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence said that Starlink terminals used by Russian forces along the front had been shut down, causing serious problems for coordination, logistics, and drone operations. That point should be stated carefully: the reported disruption is real, but attribution should be framed as a Ukrainian intelligence claim rather than as a personal action by Elon Musk.

Russia has also tightened control over domestic digital communications. More precisely, the authorities have restricted and slowed Telegram rather than simply “cutting” it outright, while also expanding wider internet controls. Reuters reported in March 2026 that these restrictions have affected communications and daily operations across Russia.

On a modern battlefield, that matters enormously. Along a front of roughly 1,200 to 1,300 kilometres, conditions change quickly, especially in areas shaped by drone warfare. Short-range drone threat zones can extend many kilometres, and battlefield information can become stale very quickly. If decisions that should take minutes instead take one or two hours, then the chances of those decisions still being accurate by the time they are implemented are much lower. That is one reason delays in communications and command can be so damaging. This is an inference from the pace of drone-centric combat and the reported communications problems.

From my own vantage point in Kyiv, the bombardment patterns have also seemed inconsistent. Some days bring multiple air raid alarms during daylight hours, which feels abnormal; on other days, there may be only one overnight alert. That is only a subjective impression, not a comprehensive military measure, but it does suggest variation in tempo rather than a uniformly escalating pattern.

As for the broader Russian system, there is a tension between tightening political control and preserving economic efficiency. Restricting information flows may strengthen state control in the short term, but it also imposes costs. Reduced information freedom, weaker digital communications, and pressure on independent media make economic and administrative systems less efficient. Russia’s broader internet crackdown in 2026 fits that pattern.

The divergence in media freedom between Russia and Ukraine is also real. Reporters Without Borders ranked Russia 155th and Ukraine 106th in its 2022 index, and by 2025, Russia had fallen to 171st while Ukraine had risen to 62nd. That does not mean Ukraine’s media environment is ideal under martial law, but it does show a substantial divergence between the two countries.

On energy, the safer formulation is this: higher oil prices can temporarily help Russian revenues, but that effect is volatile and may not translate cleanly into sustained fiscal strength. Reuters reported in March 2026 that Russia’s oil and gas revenues were still expected to fall sharply year on year despite price movements. More broadly, renewables are expanding, but it is not yet accurate to say that total global revenue from oil, gas, and coal is already in straightforward decline; fossil-fuel use and demand have remained high even as clean energy grows. 

There is also an economic constraint on Russia’s war effort. A significant portion of state revenue—particularly for financing the war—has depended on oil and gas exports. That model remains viable in the short term, but it is less stable over the longer term. Major buyers such as China continue to purchase Russian energy, but China is also investing more than any other country in renewable energy, including solar. Over time, that reduces long-term dependence on imported fossil fuels. So while short-term adjustments—such as increased trade with countries like Iran—can help, the long-term outlook for relying on fossil fuel revenues is less secure.

Rosner: Are individual Russians seeing a severe degradation in their standard of living?

Jacobsen: The effects tend to be uneven. In most oligarchic or highly unequal systems, the upper classes are insulated for longer, while the broader population feels the impact more directly over time. Sanctions, inflation, and restricted access to goods and services do affect living standards, but the degree varies across regions and social strata.

I should make two important clarifications about how I approach this. First, I am not approaching this as pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian, or vice versa. I approach it from a human rights perspective grounded in universal principles. That means evaluating both sides based on the best available evidence, including third-party assessments and independent reporting, and then forming judgments accordingly. I rely on expert analysis where appropriate and synthesize multiple independent sources rather than making claims beyond my expertise. If one side refuses to comply with third partiesthird parties, this is also information and provides a more limited picture. 

Second, it is important to distinguish between different levels of analysis. There are population-level trends—such as polling data and broad societal attitudes—that vary in reliability, especially in authoritarian contexts. Then there are individual perspectives, which can differ dramatically depending on context. For example, an individual in western Ukraine may have a very different experience and outlook than someone in Kharkiv near the front line. The same applies within Russia: perspectives vary widely depending on geography, class, and access to information.

A third point concerns how the war is framed, particularly in some Western commentary. There is often a tendency to present conflicts in binary moral terms—good versus evil. That framing can be rhetorically powerful but analytically misleading. From a human rights perspective, both sides can commit violations of international humanitarian law, including abuses involving prisoners of war or restrictions on journalists. However, the scale and systematic nature of such violations are not equivalent. The available evidence indicates that Russian forces have committed these types of abuses on a significantly larger scale. That asymmetry matters and should be stated clearly without resorting to simplistic moral binaries.

Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has struggled with corruption, as have many post-Soviet states. The collapse of the Soviet Union left institutional legacies that took time to reform. However, Ukraine has made measurable progress over time, including anti-corruption reforms, especially since 2014 and further accelerated during the war. Wartime pressures have, in some cases, strengthened internal accountability mechanisms, though corruption has not been eliminated.

Rosner: It has been four years. What is happening with corruption?

Jacobsen: Even the framing of the war’s duration varies depending on perspective. Some would say four years; others would point out that the conflict effectively began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, making this the eleventh year of war, and the fifth year of the full-scale invasion since 2022. So it is both a long war and a layered one, depending on how you define its starting point.

The war is often described as beginning in 2022, but that is only part of the picture. The violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in parts of the Donbas. I know people from Crimea who began their human rights work because of those events in 2014 and 2015, when they were still teenagers. So it is important to recognize that this is a long war, regardless of the framing.

Even if you take February 24, 2022—the start of the full-scale invasion—that is already a multi-year war. It is shorter than the Soviet Union’s involvement in World War II (1941–1945), but still a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. If you include the 2014 starting point, then it is a decade-long war. Both framings are used, depending on context.

Russia has also attempted to legitimize territorial control through referenda in occupied regions. These referenda have been widely rejected by the international community as illegitimate and conducted under coercive conditions.

Rosner: A colleague of mine, Sasha from Ukraine, often says that Ukraine is on the verge of retaking Crimea. Is there any credence to that?

Jacobsen: That likely overstates the situation. I am not a military analyst, but based on available reporting, Ukraine has retaken significant territory since 2022, particularly in parts of the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. However, Crimea remains heavily fortified and under firm Russian control.

There are competing narratives. Russia frames its actions as the “liberation” of Russian-speaking populations, while Ukraine and most of the international community view these areas as illegally annexed Ukrainian territory. The latter position reflects the broad international consensus.

At present, Russia controls roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory. Estimates vary depending on the phase of the war, but the general range has been approximately 18 to 20 percent.

Rosner: Could Ukraine retake a significant portion of the occupied territory in the next six months?

Jacobsen: In the near term, that is uncertain and likely constrained. Offensive and counteroffensive operations depend heavily on logistics, workforce, and materiel. Seasonal factors also matter. Large-scale advances are difficult during periods when one side has already committed significant resources, such as during major offensive phases.

Ukraine has previously attempted large counteroffensives. Some achieved notable gains, while others fell short of expectations due to entrenched Russian defences, including minefields, artillery, and layered fortifications.

Looking forward, Ukraine’s strategic advantage increasingly depends on technological efficiency—particularly in drones and autonomous or semi-autonomous systems. Low-cost, high-efficiency drone platforms that can deliver payloads, return, and be reused are critical. This helps offset disparities in the workforce.

Russia, by contrast, has relied more heavily on mass and attritional tactics. It has sustained higher casualty rates, both killed and wounded, but has also been willing to absorb those losses. That reflects a strategy of attrition, supported by a larger population and a greater share of the economy directed toward military production.

However, that approach is costly over time. Sustaining high personnel and equipment losses places long-term strain on resources, even for a larger state.

At the same time, war can drive internal change. In Ukraine, the invasion has produced strong national cohesion and public support for reform. Where political will exists, wartime conditions can accelerate institutional change, including anti-corruption efforts and state capacity-building.

Ukraine’s situation reflects both loss and pressure for reform. Roughly 18 to 20 percent of its territory has been under Russian occupation at various points during the full-scale war. That scale of loss creates strong internal incentives for change—particularly reforms tied to closer integration with the European Union and potential NATO membership.

To visualize the occupied area, it is sometimes roughly compared to a large U.S. state. The comparison is imperfect, but it conveys that the occupied territory is substantial. At the same time, Ukraine’s total population is smaller than California’s, so the demographic and economic impacts are significant relative to the country’s size.

Estimates suggest that several million Ukrainians—often cited in the range of around 3 to 4 million—have lived under Russian occupation at different points since 2022. These figures vary over time as front lines shift.

Rosner: Before we wrap, I want to shift briefly to another topic. I saw reports about women in the United States being subjected to C-sections against their will. In some cases, they had been in labour for many hours, and doctors intervened despite objections. Some of the cases involved Black women, and we know maternal care outcomes are often worse for Black patients. It made me think of my own experience when my wife gave birth.

She was in labour for 59 hours. Most of that time was uncomfortable rather than extreme, but it was prolonged. As I understand it, there is an optimal delivery position—typically head-first. A breech position, where the baby is positioned feet- or buttocks-first, is considered more complicated.

In our case, the baby was head-first but not ideally positioned—rotated in a way that made labour longer. We went to the hospital multiple times. Each time, they checked dilation and sent us home because labour had not progressed enough. It was only on the third visit that they admitted her.

During that time, we tried to manage the situation as best we could. We even went out briefly—saw a movie and stopped at the gym—while waiting for labour to progress. It was an unusual experience, but it reflects how variable labour can be, and how medical decisions about intervention often depend on timing, positioning, and risk assessment.

We had a long wait during the birth. At one point, I even brought 30-pound dumbbells with me because I assumed it would take a while, and I could pass the time exercising. That gives you some sense of how drawn out it was.

They eventually put us in a delivery room with a bathtub. We were there for many hours—perhaps close to a full day, though I do not recall the exact timing. At one point, I was in the bath when Carol called out that something was happening—possibly her water breaking or a sudden change in contractions. I had to rush out quickly, not exactly well-covered, while the medical staff attended to her. It was chaotic, but she endured the entire experience with remarkable fortitude for nearly 59 hours of labour.

Rick Rosner is an accomplished television writer with credits on shows like Jimmy Kimmel Live!, Crank Yankers, and The Man Show. Over his career, he has earned multiple Writers Guild Award nominations—winning one—and an Emmy nomination. Rosner holds a broad academic background, graduating with the equivalent of eight majors. Based in Los Angeles, he continues to write and develop ideas while spending time with his wife, daughter, and two dogs.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for www.rickrosner.org with more than 2,000 collaborative short-form and long-form interviews with Rick Rosner. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.

Photo by Giulia May on Unsplash

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